We study the problem faced by a supplier deciding how to dynamically allocate limited capacity among a portfolio of customers who remember the fill rates provided to them in the past. A customer's order quantity is positively correlated with past fill rates. Customers differ from one another in their contribution margins, in their sensitivity to the past, and in their demand volatility. We seek to understand the impacts of these factors on the supplier's allocation policy. We approach the problem using approximate dynamic programming, by incorporating a dynamic model of customers' behavioral responses. The model trades off customer characteristics to rationalize the fill rates the firm should target for each customer.
Introduction
Whenever a firm doing business with a handful of customers (or customer segments) faces more demand than it can supply, it faces a tough choice. On the one hand, there is a short-term opportunity for profit-taking, by supplying only the most profitable customers today. However, this is potentially damaging to the firm's relationships with less profitable customers, who receive poor service today. When future market conditions change, these neglected customers could be essential to maintaining profitability, but their goodwill towards the firm may be so diminished that their business will not materialize when it is needed most.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that can provide insight and decision support for firms dealing with this issue. The problem by definition is a dynamic one, and so we will employ approximate dynamic programming (ADP) to optimize the firm's decisions. We also incorporate a behavioral model of customer responses. The integration of a behavioral model within a modern ADP framework is novel. We believe there are opportunities to build new and interesting models with this construct in many different contexts. This paper provides a starting point for such future research.
1
Given how universal the problem is, it is surprising that little work exists on it. One explanation is that the methodological tools to handle it have not been available until recently, in particular in the area of ADP. Indeed, part of the paper's contribution is to develop some new approaches to applying and interpreting ADP, in particular methods for deriving and applying polynomial approximations, and making meaningful connections between Lagrangian duality and approximate linear programming.
The model we develop trades off three basic customer characteristics when assessing the value of a customer. As depicted in Figure 1 , these components are margin, demand volatility, and memory.
A customer may bring a higher contribution margin than others, but it may come at the price
Customer Value
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Figure 1 Components of customer value to trade-off.
of greater demand volatility. This could make the customer less valuable than other customers, leading the supplier to foster lower goodwill with the high-margin customer than with less volatile customers in the long-run. Some customers have a longer-term memory of past service quality than others, and this makes them slower to change their ordering behavior. This can be favorable or unfavorable, depending on whether the past service they received was good (they are loyal) or bad (they hold a grudge).
Taking these factors into account, the supplier's goal is to decide the quality of service to provide to each of his/her customers in the current period, so as to foster goodwill among its customers conducive to long-run profit maximization. Neglecting a customer today has long-run consequences that the firm must take into account.
Literature Review
Our work is related to several streams of literature. In the operations management literature, several researchers have recognized that poor service levels in the current period may diminish demand in subsequent periods. Olsen and Parker (2008) refer to this phenomenon as "market size dynamics," which they model by assuming that customers who face stockouts transition with some probability to a "latent" state from which they must be reacquired by the firm through advertising. Customers are otherwise homogeneous. The authors consider joint advertising and periodic review inventory management given these dynamics. Hall and Porteus (2000) and Liu et al. (2007) assume a finite pool of homogenous customers where customers may defect to a competitor upon experiencing poor service in the current period. They characterize a dynamic equilibrium among competing suppliers' capacity choices. In the related research area on quality competition, Gans (2002) assumes that each customer solves a multiarmed bandit problem each period and switches among suppliers based on her assessment of quality based on her past experience. Each of these papers shares our assumption that improved service tends to increase demand for the firm's product. They suggest one motivation for such a relationship, namely the availability to the customer of an outside supply option. On the other hand, our work is distinguished from these in our assumption of a countable set of heterogeneous and addressable customers, the fulfillment of each must be decided each period.
We point out two other connections to the operations management literature. Cachon and Lariviere (1999) examine the allocation of limited capacity to a heterogenous set of customers. Assuming customers are retailers facing their own uncertain demand, the authors' examine a simple allocation policy, "turn-and-earn," which bases allocations on retailers' past sales. The focus in their paper is quite different from ours. Whereas Cachon and Lariviere (1999) 's interest is in the competition among customers, ours is in the optimization problem faced by the supplier. A tangentially related stream of research is exemplified by Federgruen and Yang (2008) , who consider a buyer's allocation of his orders among a set of heterogeneous suppliers. Here, each supplier's allocations are determined by exogenous shocks due to, say, unpredictable supply chain disruptions.
We borrow the notion of "goodwill stock" from Nerlove and Arrow (1962) , who use the notion of goodwill to represent the persistent effects of advertising efforts in the customer base. Their work ushered in a substantial stream of literature on the optimal control of advertising expenditures.
Surveys on this research include Sethi (1977) and Feichtinger et al. (1994) . Our use of goodwill is closest to what Sethi (1977) categorizes as "advertising capital models." The interest in that research stream is on analytically characterizing the optimal timing of advertising expenditures using continuous-time optimal control formulations. Customers typically come from a single homogeneous segment. We note a fundamental difference between advertising and capacity allocation, namely that there are no natural notions of customer demand or orders for advertising.
Loosely related to this category is the work of Dube et al. (2005) , who formulate and numerically solve a competitive model wherein firms jointly choose advertising and pricing to a single homogeneous customer segment. A feature of the model is a notion of goodwill stock related to Nerlove and Arrow (1962) 's. In addition to numerically solving for the Markov perfect equilibrium among firms, the authors also investigate and demonstrate estimation of the model based on real data.
There is a substantial interest in the marketing literature on customer lifetime value (CLV) and customer relationship management (CRM). The former refers to the present value of profits obtained from a customer (or set of customers), while the latter refers to making decisions at the individual customer level about customer acquisition and advertising controls. Surveys on these topics are Gupta and Lehmann (2008) and Reinartz and Venkatesan (2008) . Our understanding of this literature is that it mainly focuses on estimation of CLV and classification-based schemes for CRM. We are aware of little work on dynamic optimization in this area. An exception is Simester et al. (2006) , who use dynamic programming to compute a policy for mailing catalogs.
Outline of Contributions
In Section 2 we formulate the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) with an average reward objective. The state of this MDP is a vector of customer goodwills representing exponentially smoothed summaries of past fill rates provided to individual customers. Customers are heterogeneous in their smoothing parameters, which parameterize the memories of the customers. In Section 3 we reformulate the MDP as an infinite-dimensional linear program, which we convert to a semiinfinite program making a general value function approximation. We show the connection between the resulting dual program and the Lagrangian dual of a static problem with martingale-type constraints. We then specify and interpret the approximate policy.
In Section 4 we fully characterize the deterministic case. In particular, we show that a simple version of the static problem, which arises under a linear value function approximation, solves the steady-state problem exactly. We show that the solution to the steady-state problem prioritizes customers according to margin. We show that the corresponding greedy policy is suboptimal, but we are able to construct a policy that achieves any goodwills that are feasible in the static problem, in particular the optimal ones, from any starting state.
Then in Section 5 we consider the stochastic case. We start by analyzing the bias function of a fluid version of the system for a single customer, showing that a polynomial ordering function gives rise to a polynomial bias function of the same order. This provides some justification for using polynomial approximations in general. We then give some examples of numerical behavior, and
show that when a linear bias function is used, the solution to the approximate linear program does not depend on customer memories. Hence, higher order approximations are required to capture the effect of customer memories when there is stochasticity.
We present the results of a detailed numerical study in Section 6. We empirically test a number of insights into the interplay between the various factors that drive goodwill. Indeed, we find that the role of customer memories is complex. Sometimes high memory is preferable, sometimes low memory is preferable, and it is hard to say which a priori because it depends on demand variances, capacity, and the relative attributes of the other customers. Fortunately, our model intelligently sorts this out. We find that high memory is beneficial in several of our examples because it ensures the customer stays loyal even when there are short-term fluctuations in service. However, when there are protracted periods of poor service, the supplier would rather the customer forget quickly so the supplier can recover the customer's business more rapidly. We conclude in Section 7 with some future directions.
Formulation
A supplier sells a single good over time to a finite set of customers I ≡ {1, 2, . . . , I}, subject to a capacity constraint of X > 0 units per period. Over time, each customer develops a sense of goodwill towards the supplier based upon the quality of past service the customer has received. We denote customer i's goodwill upon entering period t by a scalar G where β i ∈ (0, 1) is a customer-specific memory parameter and u i : [0, 1] → R + is a nondecreasing, continuous customer-specific utility function. A higher β i corresponds with longer term memory of past goodwill. For a given utility function, customers with greater memory are relatively less sensitive to short-term lapses in fill rate.
We assume that the vector of demands
. . , D I t ) in period t follows a stationary distribution with cumulative distribution function F defined over a compact Borel vector space D of demand scenarios. We permit demands across customers to be statistically dependent. Let
denote the vector of goodwills in period t. We drop the time index t when appropriate.
To formulate the problem as a Markov decision process, we need to define state and action spaces. The lowest goodwill is achieved by a zero fill-rate, i.e. solves
we can define the goodwill state-space as the compact set G = {G ∈ R I + :
Given a Borel space Z we denote by B(Z) the Banach space of all Borel measurable bounded functions on Z, i.e. functions f having finite norm ||f || = sup z∈Z |f (z)|. For a given goodwill state G, the action-space X (G) represents the allocations provided under each demand scenario and is defined by
It will also be useful to define the action-space after a demand scenario D ∈ D is observed:
Throughout the paper, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The ordering functions {y i } i∈I are continuous, non-decreasing, lower-bounded away from zero, and bounded on G × D.
Under this assumption, the state-action space
is compact. Although in principle our solution methodology can accommodate zero order sizes, by assuming that the y's are lower-bounded away from zero we eliminate a distracting mathematical complication that would overly complicate proofs and results. Disallowing the y's from equaling 0 also avoids numerical scaling difficulties.
Let βG+u(x/y(G, D)) be a vectorized representation of the expressions
for all i, which denote the next state. Assuming that the Markov decision process is unichain, we can write the optimality equations as
where h(·) ∈ B(G) is the bias function, ρ ∈ R is the gain. Equivalently, because we choose an allocation for every demand realization, we can bring the maximization inside the expectation and write the optimality equations as
The advantage of this representation is that the expression in square brackets represents the optimization problem to be solved each period, after demand is observed, in implementing the control policy given a bias function h.
General Approximations
We first formulate the optimality equations (1) as a linear program. We then provide primal-dual semi-infinite linear programming formulations when the value function is restricted to a linear combination of general basis functions, and we prove strong duality. Then, we provide a simpler static model that can be viewed as an approximation of the semi-infinite model.
Linear Programming
By changing the equality in (1) into an inequality, we can write the optimality equations as the infinite-dimensional linear program
Because feasible solutions (ρ, h) have a bounded bias function, it follows from Lemma 6.4.1 of Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (1996) that ρ provides an upper bound on the reward of any policy starting from any state.
To formulate the dual program, let B(Z) denote the collection of Borel subsets of a Borel space
} be the set of associated state-action pairs leading from states G ∈ G. Also, let M(Z) denote the Banach space of signed measures on the Borel space Z having finite total variation norm, and let 1l{·} denote the indicator function. We then have
The measure µ can be interpreted as representing the average time spent in each set of stateaction pairs. Constraint (4b) requires that the flow in equals the flow out for every Borel subset of G, while constraint (4c) ensures that µ is a probability measure. Now suppose we are given a collection K = {1, 2, . . . , K} of basis functions {φ k (·)} k∈K , where
Substitute this into (3) to obtain the semi-infinite program
Because this h approximation is in B(G), for any feasible solution (ρ, w) we have that ρ upper bounds the average reward of any policy, and the optimal objective value of (D 0 ).
The dual of this program is
where supp(·) denotes the support set.
Theorem 1 (Duality). Suppose {φ k } k∈K are continuous functions on G. Then (P φ ) is solvable and sup (P φ ) = inf (D φ ).
Proof. By Theorem 12 on page 80 of Glashoff and Gustafson (1983) , the result holds provided (1) M is compact, (2) (P φ ) is consistent, and (3) (D φ ) meets the Slater condition, i.e. there exists a solution that satisfies (5b) with strict inequality. The compactness of M follows from Assumption 1 and the compactness of G × D.
To show that (P φ ) is consistent, for each i ∈ I define
Consider the setX = x ∈ R I : i∈I x i ≤ X, 0 ≤ x i ≤ y i ∀i ∈ I . Because X > 0 and y i > 0 for all i, we can choosex ∈X that is in the interior ofX . Define f i =x i /y i to be the smallest fill-rate for customer i, and let f be the corresponding vector. Then set
Next, consider aĜ that solveŝ
Therefore, for every k ∈ K we have for (Ĝ,x)
Hence, we can set M = {(Ĝ,x)} and µ(Ĝ,x) = 1 to obtain a feasible solution to (P φ ).
Lastly, we need to verify that (D φ ) has a Slater point. Set w k = 0 for all k ∈ K, and then choose
Then, this (w, ρ) satisfies (5b) with strict inequality, and therefore the Slater condition is satisfied.
The solvability of (D φ ) is not necessarily guaranteed, but in our numerical work we will only solve (P φ ). We will do so using column generation. For a given dual price vector w on (6b) and price ρ on (6c), to find a new column we solve
If the optimal objective value is positive, then we add a new variable µ(G * , x * ) corresponding with an optimal solution (G * , x * ). If the optimal objective value is non-positive, then the current solution to (P φ ) is optimal. This subproblem is generally nonconvex, so it may be difficult to guarantee that the optimal objective value is non-positive in practice.
Static Model
As a simplification of the above formulations, consider the following static model:
This problem finds an optimal goodwill vector G to target, together with an allocation policy x for that G, which maximizes the expected reward subject to martingale-type constraints (7b) defined about basis functions. The advantages of this formulation are that it is easier to explain, and easier to solve because it does not require column generation.
Suppose w k is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint k ∈ K given by (7b). Then, the Lagrangian dual can be expressed as
This, in fact, is the same as (D φ ), where ρ in an optimal solution achieves the maximum.
Thus, we can interpret (D φ ) as the Lagrangian dual of the static problem (P static ). However, solutions to (P static ) do not provide bounds, in contrast with (P φ )-(D φ ). In fact, the static problem merely produces an optimal solution to (P φ ) under the additional restriction |M | = 1, i.e. µ is the Dirac measure. We can intepret (6b) as requiring the martingale-type constraints (7b) to hold in expectation, under the probability measure µ. Hence, the gap between (D φ ) and (P static ) can be large and so the latter is typically not a good substitute for (D φ ). The static problem produces an initial feasible solution for (P φ ) that can be used as a starting point for the column generation procedure.
Approximate Policy
The above framework provides a simple control policy, based on solving the right-hand side of (1) under the functional approximation obtained by solving (D φ ). Suppose in a given period, the demand realization is D and the customers have goodwill vector G. Given optimal dual variables
or possibly a multi-period lookahead version of this problem.
In the special case of an identity utility function u i (f ) = f , and a linear basis function
for each i ∈ I, this policy becomes a simple linear program. The objective coefficient for decision
This expression decomposes the marginal value of customer i into components: the immediate contribution margin r i plus the customer's future marginal value. Hence, we obtain an index policy, with customer i's priority index as given above. Intuitively, this policy makes sense. As the goodwill G i decreases for a customer i, he orders less quantity
Provided w * i > 0, this raises the priority of customer i. Hence, a customer whose goodwill is too low is propped up, at the expense possibly of a customer whose goodwill is currently high.
Deterministic Case
Consider a deterministic special case of the problem where D = D t for all t and D is known. Under this assumption, we do not need to index the variables x and the function y by D. That is, we write x = x(D) and y(G, D) = y(G). Other assumptions are as in the general case.
In the deterministic special case we can write the problems (D 0 ) and (P 0 ) as
Define the "static" problem aŝ
and denote the feasible space of the static problem byM. This is the same as (7) for linear basis functions φ, except that G is merely required to be non-negative. We'll see next that these apparent relaxations of the static problem have no force; in fact, the static problem is exact.
Optimality of the Static Problem
We require the following lemma. Let X = {x : ∃G with (G, x) ∈ M} andX = x : ∃G with (G, x) ∈M .
Consider a (G, x) ∈ M. For each i, letū i : R + → R + be a continuous and nondecreasing function
is clearly continuous and monotonically increasing in G i .
Thus, some (G ) i solves the following equation for fixed x i :
Suppose that
This implies
. This is a contradiction; we
Using this lemma, we can show that the static problem yields the optimal problem value.
Theorem 3. For the deterministic special case,ρ = ρ * .
Proof. Let h(G) = 0 for all G, and let
This pair (h, ρ) is clearly feasible in (D 0 -Deterministic). Furthermore, by the lemma we have ρ =
Let (Ĝ,x) be an optimal solution to the static problem, and let µ * be the Dirac measure concentrated on (Ĝ,x). Considering this as a solution to (P 0 -Deterministic), the first constraint of The other constraints of (P 0 -Deterministic) are clearly satisfied by µ * . The objective of (P 0 -Deterministic) under the solution µ * is i∈I r ixi =ρ.
The optimality ofρ follows from strong duality.
Characterization of the Static Solution
Our next result shows that while the u's, β's, and y's affect the optimal steady-state allocation quantities, when demand is deterministic, customers are prioritized by highest margin first in steady state. Memory plays no role in this prioritization. Interestingly, in subsection 4.3 we provide an example showing that a greedy policy nevertheless can be suboptimal even when demand is deterministic.
Proposition 4. Assume, without loss of generality, that customers are ordered such that r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r n . The following x * is an optimal solution to problem (8)- (11):
Proof. Fix a customer i. First observe that for any feasible
1−β i . We next show that for any 0 ≤ x i ≤ŷ i , there is a G i that solves the linear subsystem (10)-(11).
Choose some 0 ≤ x i ≤ŷ i and observe that equation (11), equivalently,
, which is a contradiction. Thus, we have established that there is always a solution for G i to the system (10)-(11) for any 0 ≤ x i ≤ŷ i .
We can thus rewrite problem (8)- (11) as
This problem is a continuous relaxation of a knapsack problem with nonnegative rewards, for which the greedy solution is known to be optimal.
While Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal allocations given to customers in steady state, it does not provide guidance on how to reach that steady state. This result does not imply that a greedy policy is optimal. In fact, in the next section we show that a greedy policy is not necessarily optimal.
Illustrative Example
The following example illustrates behaviour that is possible. Consider a single customer, and suppose the capacity is X = 1. Suppose the customer has no memory, which means that β = 0.
Furthermore, the customer uses the identity function for utility, i.e. u(f ) = f . The order function is deterministic and highly convex:
Thus, y is piecewise linear with y(0) = 0, y(.9) = 1 and y(1) = 1000.
First, consider the greedy policy, which always maximizes the shipment quantity in each period t, i.e. x t = min{y(G t ), 1}. Table 1 shows the first steps of the resulting trajectory, starting from G 0 = .9. The policy alternates between goodwills of 1 and .001, and produces an average delivery rate of .50055.
Next, consider a policy which does not sell out all capacity, even when there are sufficient orders to do so. Instead, it holds the fill-rate constant at .9. Table 2 shows the resulting trajectory, which achieves a much higher average delivery rate of .9 as compared with the greedy policy.
The greedy policy performs much more poorly because it over-inflates the customer's expectations by delivering a 100% fill rate. Because the customer has no memory of previous poor service, the customer falsely jumps to the conclusion that the supplier will provide a high-fill rate even if ordering a large quantity, in this case for 1000 units. Since the supplier can only provide at most one unit, the fill-rate (and goodwill) precipitously drops to close to 0. This results in a smaller order in the following period, which can satisfied with 100% fill-rate, and on it goes. Table 1 Sample trajectory for the greedy policy.
t G t y t x t 0 .9 1 .9 1 .9 1 .9 2 .9 1 .9 3 .9 1 .9 4 .9 1 .9 ... ... ... ... Average x = .9 Table 2 Sample trajectory for a fixed fill-rate policy.
This example demonstrates two key points:
1. It is not necessarily optimal for the supplier to sell-out its capacity.
2. Even though the optimal steady-state solution to (8)- (11) is greedy as described by Proposition 4, the greedy policy may be suboptimal and may not produce the optimal steady-state solution.
Communication with Feasible Static Goodwill States
In this section, we show that, under certain assumptions, all goodwill states that solve the static problem can be reached (at least in the limit) from a large set of initial goodwill states using a feasible policy. Hence, the reward of any static feasible state can be replicated by some policy from any starting state. Furthermore, in contrast with the example in Section 4.3, this policy is not the greedy policy maximizing one-period total reward.
In addition to Assumption 1 in Section 2, for the purposes of this section we will assume that the u i functions are invertible. Suppose we would like to converge to a target goodwill vector G * . We assume that there exists a x * such that (x * , G * ) is feasible in the static prob-
Consider the following policy. In period t, set
We first show that this policy is feasible and then that it results in convergence of G t to G * .
Proposition 5. Under the proposed policy, the allocation x t is feasible for all t.
Proof. We need to show that for all t, 0 ≤ x
Proof. Fix a customer i, and consider two exhaustive cases.
, and observe that lim t→∞Ĝ
Under the assumption of this case and the above inequality, we have G
It follows from the definition of the policy that for all t ≥ τ ,
, and hence lim t→∞
Stochastic Case
As Theorem 3 shows, a linear value function approximation suffices for optimality in the deterministic case. However, when demand is stochastic we will generally need a higher order approximation to capture tradeoffs. Ultimately, we will use polynomials. To justify this, we consider a fluid approximation for a problem having only a single customer. We show that under a constant fill-rate policy and polynomial ordering function y, the bias function is a polynomial having the same order as y. The Weierstrass approximation theorem tells us that polynomials are dense, i.e. they can fit continuous functions on a compact domain arbitrarily closely. This provides some theoretical justification for using such an approximation.
To help us understand the role of β, we show in Section 5.3 that under certain conditions, when using linear basis functions, the models (D φ )-(P φ ) do not capture the role of β in the system dynamics. Hence, this further argues for the use of higher order polynomial bias function approximations.
Fluid Approximation of the Single-Customer Problem
Consider the problem of maximizing long-run average rewards from a single customer i with initial goodwill G i (0). Assume that the ordering function y i (G i (t)) is a deterministic function of goodwill
The problem can be formulated as the following:
In what follows, we will suppress the index i. Let γ = 1 − β, then we can write equation (18) as
.
This is equivalent to the following equation with time increment δ = 1,
Taking the limit as δ → 0 yields
This leads to the following fluid approximation of the single-customer problem:
5.1.1. A Constant Fill-rate Policy Now imagine a policy whereby the supplier always fulfills orders to satisfy a predetermined fill rate F * . We assume that
≥ F * for all t so that this policy is feasible. Under this policy, the goodwill trajectory satisfies the differential equation,
It is straightforward to verify that this equation, with initial condition G(0) = G 0 , has solution
Define the bias function h(G 0 ) as the difference between the total reward of the assumed policy and its total reward assuming steady state:
Solving for Particular Ordering Functions
Assume y(G) takes the form y(G) = Dz(G), where D is a random variable and z is a deterministic function. Then
where
We would like to solve for h(G 0 ) given a choice of z. When z is a polynomial, we have the following general result.
Theorem 7. If z() is a polynomial with order N , then
Proof. Assume z(G) = N n=0 c n x n , for any N and c 1 , . . . , c N .
where the scalars b nm are known polynomial functions of a 0 . In particular, we have b nn = 1 and
c n a
which is an order N polynomial in a 1 . Therefore h(G 0 ) is an order N polynomial in G 0 .
Examples of Appoximation Behavior
In this subsection we provide a single-and two-customer example that illustrate the bias functions we obtain.
Single Customer Example of Polynomial Bias Functions
To illustrate the approximate bias functions we obtain with higher order polynomials, consider a single-customer example with capacity X = 0.2. Take the utility function to be the identity function, and set As the polynomial order increases, the upper bound ρ decreases, and appears to converge to the maximum average delivery quantity. When N = 2, the concave shape is due to the fact that a goodwill G in the range of 0.9 is targeted. As goodwill lowers below this level, transient rewards decrease relative to the optimal reward rate. As goodwill rises above this level, the customer's expectations are too high and she orders too much, making lower fill-rates imminent, and therefore lower transient rewards. The reason for the modality with higher order approximations comes from the fact that in an optimal solution to (P φ ) there are multiple (G, x) targeted, i.e. that have µ(G, x) > 0.
Feasible average allocation regions for relaxations Next consider a two customer
instance with two equally likely demand scenarios, as shown in the following table.
Each customer has a memory of β i = 0.5, and capacity is X = 1. We make the same assumptions on u i and y i as in the last example. In Figure 3 we plot the feasible average x i values for various relaxations. The red region corresponds to the knapsack region
which ignores stochasticity. The next smaller, green region, considers the stochastic region
ignoring the goodwill transition law. The blue region corresponds to the feasible region of (P φ ) when the basis functions are linear, and hence considers the goodwill transition law. Lastly, the pink region shows the feasible region of (P φ ) when the basis functions are linear and quadratic functions of goodwill for each customer separately. Hence, as the approximation's fidelity increases, the feasible region shrinks to reflect the true feasible region more accurately. 
Figure 3
Feasible allocations under various approximations.
Invariance with β Under Linear Approximation
In this section we provide further support for the use of higher order approximations by demonstrating that for a large set of problem instances, the policy of Section 3.3 is invariant to the β i parameters.
We make the following assumptions for the purposes of this section.
for someẑ i () that does not depend on β i .
If we approximate h() with a linear function,
To denote the dependence on β, we refer to this problem as (D φ − β). Similarly, we denote the set M by M(β) to emphasize its dependence on β. We can write M(β) as
∀i ∈ I and ∀D ∈ D Lemma 8. For any β andβ, (D φ − β) is identical to (D φ −β).
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing a one-to-one mapping between constraints in (D
and equivalent constraints in (D φ −β). Take any constraint (G, x) from (D φ − β) and definē
. Furthermore,
is numerically identical to the constraint (Ḡ, x) of (D φ −β). This mapping can be inverted, in that we can map any constraint
An immediate implication of the lemma is that any optimal solution {ρ * , w * } to (D φ − β) will also be optimal in (D φ −β) for anyβ. The following relationship between the policies under different β's follows.
Proposition 9. For a given order vector y, the policy's allocation x at goodwill G under β is the same as the allocation at goodwill G(1 −β)/(1 − β) underβ.
Proof. The policy's allocation under β solves the following nonlinear program:
Because the w i 's are invariant with respect to β, and becauseḠ
construction, the policy allocation underβ solves a numerically equivalent nonlinear program.
We note that goodwill G under β corresponds naturally withḠ underβ in the following sense.
If we were to supply a customer having memory parameter β i with constant fill rate F * , he would
If we were supply a customer withβ i with the same fill rate F * , he would converge to goodwillḠ
On the other hand, under a particular sample path, we will not generally haveḠ Now consider two different β's, β = 0.8, and β = 0.5. Start the first system at G 0 = 0.5 and the second system at G 0 = 0.2. These map to identical shares z 0 = z 0 = 0.1. By Proposition 9, the policy decision will be the same; suppose for the sake of illustration that the supplier provides a fill-rate of 0.8 to each customer. Then, the goodwills transition as shown in Table 4 . Observe that the customer with longer memory transitions to a lower share z 1 = 0.24 compared with the other customer'sz 1 = 0.45. Because the next order is lower, the supplier will likely provide a higher fillrate in the second period to the high memory customer, which will continue through the system's transient dynamics. Thus, a higher memory will result in a higher short-term fill-rate because the customer's goodwill is stickier, calling for lower and therefore easier to satisfy orders. Table 4 Trajectories for different β's.
Numerical Study
This section explores the problem and proposed policy through a numerical study. Our primary goals here are to demonstrate the quality of the proposed policy versus the greedy policy and to explore the policies' dependence on various customer attributes, including margins, demand variances, and memory parameters.
For the purposes of this section, we do not solve (D φ ) directly. Instead, we solve (P φ ) using column generation as described in Section 3.1. We refer to the solution to this problem as the "LP solution." We implement the column generation and policy simulations in AMPL, and we use KNITRO version 6.0 as our nonlinear programming solver. As pointed out in Section 3.1, the optimal ρ in (D φ ) upper bounds the achievable rewards under all policies. However, we terminate the column generation approach when the reduced profits relative to the objective function fall below a pre-specified small tolerance, thus our solutions are not necessarily optimal in (D φ ) and therefore are not guaranteed to bound the optimal average reward. The associated policy is as described in Section 3.3, although we add one step of lookahead to the policy problem of Section 3.3.
We assume an identity utility function u i (f ) = f throughout, and we assume y i takes the form
with two choices for the "share function" z i specified below and illustrated in Figure 4 .
We choose the linear share function for simplicity and the S-shaped share function because such an "S" shape commonly arises from choice models. ε is a parameter of the S-shaped curve that gives its intercept; we take ε = 0.05. Both functions are scaled such that
yields the same value regardless of β i .
We start in Section 6.1 with results on two-customer instances designed to reveal insights into the interaction among rewards, variance, and memories. Section 6.2 further explores the impact of customer memories on the problem through close analysis of a single-customer example. Finally, Section 6.3 presents and interprets results on larger examples.
Examination of Two-Customer Examples
Consider an example with two customers, A and B, who differ only in their margins. We construct such an example by generating 40 equiprobable demand scenarios in which the D i 's are drawn Figure 5 that while the greedy policy depends only on the relative ranking of the two margins, the approximate policy more evenly allocates its capacity to the two customers, particularly when the two margins are relatively close. Accordingly, when the two margins are close, the approximate policy exhibits its greatest reward advantage over the greedy approach.
We next examine a case where the customers differ not only in their rewards but also in the variances of their demand random variables. We again generate the demand scenarios using independent draws from lognormal distributions. In Figure 6 , we give results on problem instances where the generative distribution for Customer A's demand scenarios has mean 1 and standard devation 0.6 while the generative distribution for Customer B has mean 1 and standard deviation either 0.2 or 1.0.
The comparison of the two sets of curves in Figure 6 reveals the impact of demand variance on rewards and allocations. In keeping with intuition, adding variance to the system is damaging to the supplier, as his rewards are highest when Customer B's demand variance is lowest. Interestingly, when Customer B has low variance and r B is just below r A = 1, Customer B receives larger orders on average (and experiences higher goodwill) than Customer A. This exemplifies a claim made in our introduction, that a supplier may want to foster higher goodwill with a lower-margin customer if the customer's demand volatility is also lower.
We also see that shipments made to Customer B depend inversely on her demand variance under both the approximate and greedy policies. We explore this further in the following section.
Finally, we examine a case where the customers have statistically identical D i 's, but the customers differ in their memory parameters β i . We observe that in our example, β B seems to make the most difference when r B < r A . In these cases, the majority of the supplier's capacity goes to Customer A, and the amount of leftover capacity available for Customer B is variable. The supplier benefits here when Customer B is more loyal and thus less sensitive to this variability. Interestingly, the rewards of the approximate policy seem to be less impacted by the change in β B than are the rewards of the greedy policy, suggesting that differing customer loyalties can be somewhat managed with a sufficiently intelligent policy.
In the following section, we investigate the impact of memory and the interactions between variance and memory more closely through analysis of a specially designed example.
The Impact of β
Consider a simple single-customer problem with linear share function z. We assume that the customer has margin r = 1 and that the supplier's capacity is 0.5. The random demand D takes values 0.5 and 1.0 with equal probability, yielding a demand standard deviation of 0.25. In this particular single-customer instance, the policy computed using N = 2 coincides very closely with the greedy policy that always allocates the minimum of capacity and the customer's order. Avg. x B r B Policy beta^B=.9
Gdy beta^B=.9
Policy beta^B=.1 Gdy beta^B=.1
Figure 7 Simulated policy rewards and Customer B allocations as r B varies. Cases shown for high and low Customer B memory. Figure 8 gives the simulated average shipments (which correspond with the average rewards because r = 1) under the approximate policy as a function of β for this problem instance along with a "low variance" version where the two demand scenarios are 0.625 and 0.875 for a demand standard devation of 0.125. As we saw in the previous section, increasing demand variance leads to lower overall shipments and lower overall rewards. Interestingly, the shipments are increasing in β (albeit slightly) under low demand variance and decreasing in β under high demand variance. This underscores the interaction between β and variance and the complex impact of β on the problem.
To illuminate this impact, in the remainder of this section we will look more closely at the high variance instance of Figure 8 . Consider a particular sample path under which D simply alternates (deterministically) between 0.5 and 1.0. Figure 9 shows this sample path and the steady state orders and shipments under it for two different choices of β. Notice that in even-numbered periods, D is 1.0 and the customer places large orders that significantly exceed the supplier's capacity of 0.5. In odd-numbered periods, however, D is 0.5 and the supplier can fully fulfill the customer orders. In both plots of Figure 9 , therefore, the supplier alternates between selling out his capacity and fulfilling diminished customer orders. The customer, in turn, receives fill rates that alternate between good and poor. Because of her shorter memory, the low-β customer in the left-hand plot experiences large goodwill fluctuations which lead to a more variable order stream. Because the supplier's capacity is limited, he is capped in his ability to satisfy big orders. As order variance increases, the supplier's average shipment therefore decreases. The net impact is that the average shipment decreases as β decreases. Conversely, we see that a high β can be beneficial to the supplier due to its tendency to smooth the customer's order stream and therefore increase average shipment sizes.
On the other hand, consider the sample path of Figure 10 , where D alternates between 4-period sequences of constant demands. In both plots of Figure 10 , when D is high, for example from This damages the customer goodwill such that when D falls to 0.5 in period 9, the customer's diminished goodwill translates to an order below 0.4 and strictly less than the supplier's capacity.
The low-β customer thankfully bounces back quickly, placing an order nearing 0.5 as early as period 10. However, the high-β customer holds a grudge and is still ordering less than capacity through period 12. Because of this extended period of reduced shipments, the high-β customer is less rewarding to the supplier on average under this sample path. In short, a small β is advantageous here because it allows quick recovery from low goodwill states. Under our model, demands are independent over time. A realistic sample path in this model will of course contain demand subsequences like the ones considered here as well as others. Although these results show that β can be impactful, they also indicate that the impact of β is complex and difficult to characterize in general. The results of Figure 7 and in the following section are examples in which long customer memory is on balance advantageous to the supplier. However, we maintain that this should not necessarily be obvious a priori.
Six-Customer Examples
In this section we report on larger instances that are intended to reflect the situation of a hypothetical manufacturer who must divide its fixed capacity each period between two products, each 
Figure 11
Average rewards and order variances as functions of β for a single-period problem under three particular demand sample paths.
demanded by a small number of customers. We model this situation with several instances featuring six customers and 20 scenarios each. Of the six customers, we assume that three of them (Type A customers) demand the more profitable product while three of them (Type B customers) demand a less profitable product that requires the same capacity. Prices paid by individual customers are negotiated within relatively small ranges, though margins for the second product are approximately 30% lower than the first. Accordingly, we assign margins of (1.02, 1.01, 1.00, 0.72, 0.71, 0.70) to the six customers. While a greedy policy will heavily prioritize Type A customers, a more balanced policy might transfer some capacity to the Type B customers to stimulate ordering in low-demand scenarios. We assume that each customer has the same memory parameter: 0.5. We generate the random scenarios by drawing (independently for each customer and scenario) from a lognormal distribution with mean one and standard deviation 0.6. We assume the S-shaped ordering function for all the instances considered here. The rewards of both policies are estimated using a simulation of 1000 periods. Table 5 gives the results on five such randomly generated instances. We make a few observations.
The rewards under both the LP solution and the two policies are increasing and concave in the capacity X. While our approximate policy exhibits performance 1-2% below that of the LP solution, it is consistently stronger than the greedy policy. The advantage of our approach is somewhat instance-dependent, but typically larger under X = 3 and X = 4 than under X = 2. We have observed the advantage of our approach to be greatest for moderate capacity values. When capacity is very tightly constrained, capacity itself primarily drives problem rewards under both policies. Table 5 Numerical results for 6-customer, 20-scenario instances. Instances are randomly generated under the base case parameters. Standard errors around simulated values are included in parentheses.
All of the results in Table 5 were generated assuming N = 2, although in our later results a few instances were solved assuming N = 3 when the resulting policy performance was seen to be significantly better. CPU times (on a 2.4GHz Intel Xeon processor) for the LP solutions in Table 5 range from just under 5 minutes to just over 9 minutes. For N = 3, these times grow to approximately 20 minutes per instance.
Careful examination of a particular instance sheds light on the advantage of the approximate policy over the greedy policy. Figure 12 plots the margin and the average fill rate provided to each customer under the approximate policy and greedy policy for instance 4 with X = 3. Of course, the fill rates given customers under the greedy policy monotonically decrease with customer margins. The ordering of the customers' margins, not their magnitudes, dictates the fill rates given customers. In contrast, the approximate policy treats customers with similar margins similarly, spreading its capacity more evenly among the customers. The approximate policy also achieves much more steady rewards over time than does the greedy policy. The standard deviation of total rewards in this instance is 0.35 under the greedy policy and 0.20 under the approximate policy. Table 6 shows results (averaged over the five instances) where we alter the standard deviations 
Figure 12
Illustration of the average fill rate under the approximate policy and the greedy policy for instance 4.
std A and std B of the lognormal distributions used to generate the demand scenarios for the Type A and Type B customers, respectively. As we might expect and as we saw in the two-customer case, the total rewards decrease as we add variance to the problem under both policies. However, the decrease is less pronounced under the approximate policy than under the greedy policy. That is, the approximate policy seems more robust to variance in the D i random variables. In addition, higher variance among Type A customers appears to be more damaging to total rewards than higher variance among Type B customers. We observe that when variance is low among Type A customers, the approximate and greedy policies perform similarly. Intuitively, in these instances the risk of focusing attention on the top customers is limited.
In the examples discussed so far, we have assumed that the random variables D i are independent across customers. We now examine the implications of introducing some correlation structure. We consider two new regimes. To induce positive correlations, we first generate multivariate normal random variates with correlation 0.5 between all pairs of customers. We then take exponentials of these random variates to form lognormally distributed variates. To induce negative correlations, we follow a similar procudure, although the correlation matrix we use has correlations of 0.5 within types and -0.5 across types. Table 7 gives the results under these regimes. We see that both regimes yield lower rewards than under the original independent demand case, presumably because the positive correlations among customers (among all customers in the "positive correlation" regime and within types in the "negative correlation" regime) accentuates the overall order volatility seen by the supplier. Negative correlation across types mitigates this somewhat, as we see that the rewards under the "negative correlation" regime are slightly higher than under the "positive correlation" regime.
Of particular interest is the dependence of the results on the memory parameters β i . We change the memory parameters of the two types of customers to examine this dependence, and the results % over % over % over Standard deviation of D X = 2 Greedy X = 3 Greedy X = 4 Greedy LP Solution std A = 0.30, std B = 0.30 2.018
1 Table 7 Average rewards under different customer demand correlation regimes. Results represent averages over five randomly generated instances of this exercise appear in Table 8 . As the β i 's of the customers increase, so do the rewards obtained -markedly under the greedy policy and more slightly under the approximate policy. We see that the advantage of our approximate policy over the greedy policy is accentuated when memories are short. It is instructive to examine under which memory parameters and under which capacities the approximate policy is most impactful. For X = 2, the gap between the approximate and greedy % over % over % over Memory parameters X = 2 Greedy X = 3 Greedy X = 4 Greedy LP Solution β A = 0.25, β B = 0.25 Table 8 Average rewards under various alternate regimes of customer memory parameters. Results represent averages over five randomly generated instances policy is largest when β A is small. With such limited capacity, the supplier can sell nearly all his capacity by managing the Type A customers and largely ignoring the Type B customers. On the other hand, when capacity is looser, say when X = 4, the supplier gives good service to the Type A customers, but his ability to sell out of his capacity depends on his management of the Type B customers. This explains why β B seems to drive the performance gap more than β A for the larger capacities in Table 8 .
We conclude this section by pulling several of our numerical insights together to design a set of instances where the difference between our approximate policy and the greedy policy is particularly large. We have chosen a regime in which the difference between Type A and Type B rewards is smaller (roughly 1.0 and 0.9, versus 1.0 and 0.7 considered in the previous cases), we use std A = std B = 0.9 and β A = β B = 0.25. Correlations are induced using the same methodology used to generate the "negative correlation across types" instances in Table 7 . Table 9 gives the results for the instances. We see that the various effects we have identified combine so that the approximate policy outperforms the greedy policy by amounts nearing 10%.
Future Directions
This work opens up new directions in exploring the role of customer behavior in supplier allocation problems. We have provided perhaps the simplest model, in which we assume customers % over % over % over X = 2 Greedy X = 3 Greedy X = 4 Greedy LP Solution Table 9 Average rewards under a regime designed to accentuate the difference between the approximate and greedy policies. Results represent averages over five randomly generated instances react solely to a single goodwill statistic that represents a smoothed average of service utility. More sophisticated models could consider other statistics, such as goodwills based on fill rate variance or other metrics. We could also incorporate pricing decisions into the problem, and allow goodwill to depend on prices as well as fill-rate. Other forms of ordering functions and utility functions, perhaps based on prospect theory, could be explored. The ADP approach in this paper makes such models numerically tractable. Indeed, an interesting future direction would be to empirically validate possible forms of ordering functions, perhaps based on running experiments or mining large datasets on real customers. It would also be interesting to explore the efficacy of the latest nonconvex optimization methodologies, such as polynomial programming (Lasserre 2001) , in solving the subproblems that arise. Furthermore, one could explore methods for devising stronger value function approximations in this context.
